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Accountability in education: Meeting our commitments

Exploring the composition of school councils and its relationship to council effectiveness as an accountability tool

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Abstract

The intention of this paper is to describe the specifics of school-based management arrangements in low and middle income developing countries; and potentially how these are related to performance in terms of school inputs, teacher working conditions, and of student performance.

A large number of sources have been consulted and usable evidence was found in about 100 of them. There was usually substantial discussion of the national social and political and policy context, but there is overwhelming evidence that the vast majority of variation in implementation is within and not between countries; and there was very limited evidence on the actual school-level process of constituting the beneficiary control groups, their composition, roles and responsibilities and statutory powers; or on the frequency of and attendance at meetings or what is discussed.

Several studies include evidence on performance, defined in various ways, tend to show that there is a small positive effect of decentralization on the aspects of performance that have been measured; but as different definitions are used in each of the countries, a synthesis of results is difficult. But there are very few studies that have related specifics of the school council management arrangements to any of these performance measures.

The lack of systematic evidence is surprising given the attention that has been paid to this subject.

Abbreviations

ACE	Asociación Comunitaria de Educación (Community Education Association)
AECO	Asociación Educativa Comunitaria (Community Education Association)
ADEL	Asociación de Desarrollo Educativo Local (Local Association for the Development of Education)
AGE	Apoyo a la Gestión Escolar (Support to School Management) (Mexico)
APF	Asociación de Padres de Familia (Parents Associations)
CDD	Community Driven Development
COEDUCA	Comité Educative Local (Local School Councils)
COGES	Comités de Gestion des Etablissements Scolaires, (School Management Committees) (Burkina Faso)
EDUCO	Educación con Participación de la Comunidad (Education with Community Participation) (El Salvador)
ENLACE	Evaluación Nacional del Logro Académico en Centros Escolares (National Assessment of Student Performance in Schools) (Mexico)
FAF	Fiombonan'Antoka amin'ny Fampandrosoana (Partnership for School Development functions as School Management Committee) (Madagascar)
FHIS	Fondo Hondureño de Inversión Social (Honduras Fund for Social Investment)
FRAM	Fikambanan'ny Ray aman-drenin'ny Mpianatra (Parents Association) (Madagascar)
NERA	Núcleos Educativos Rurales Autónomos (Autonomous Clusters for Rural Education)
PDE	Plano de Desenvolvimento da Escola (School Development Plan)
PEC/QSP	Programa de Escuelas de Calidad (Quality School Programme) (Mexico)
PEC-FIDE	Programa de Escuelas de Caldidad - Fortalecimiento e Inversión Directa a las Escuelas (Program of Strengthening and Direct Investment in School) (Mexico)
PROHECO	Programa Hondureño de Educación Comunitaria (Honduras Programme of Community Education)
PRONADE	Programa Nacional de Autogestión para el Desarrollo Educativo (National Programme for Autonomous Management for Educational Development)
PSD	Primary School Development (Ghana)
PSI	President's Special Initiative (Ghana)
PTA	Parent-Teachers Association
QUIPS	Quality Improvement in Primary Schools (Ghana)
SCRP	School Council Report Card (Uganda)
SGB	School Governing Body
SIF	Social Investment Fund (Honduras)
SMC	School Management Committee
SMM	School Management Manual (Gambia)
SdPF	Sociedad de Padres de Familia (Association of Parents) (El Salvador)
SSA	Sarva Shiksa Abhiyan (Education for All) (India)
VEC	Village Education Committee
WSD	Whole School Development (Ghana)

Outline

1. Introduction

Nomenclature: The School Based Management literature uses a large number of terms when referring to the organization at the community/school level: these are explained in detail in Appendix 1.

Sources: The following analysis includes only sources in English, French, Portuguese or Spanish. The literature divides into broadly three categories: mainly quantitative analyses of pilot projects, randomized control trials, some of which use very sophisticated econometric estimation techniques; mainly quantitative analyses of the small number of large-scale and national programmes; and a plethora of case study reports and qualitative policy analyses. But, although many sources provide contextual information on the subject, they do not contain the breadth or depth of analysis necessary to build a substantial discussion of the recurring themes (Muwanda, 2000); the actual process of constituting the beneficiary control groups like the Village Education Committee (VEC), its composition, roles and responsibilities, and statutory powers need to be looked at carefully, both in concept and in practice (Banerjee et al., 2010).

Policy and practice: there is only limited evidence on how the various programmes of school councils is actually implemented in each school. Many school councils are 'paper tigers' in that, whilst formally having decision-making powers, they simply rubber-stamp decisions that the School Director or Head has made (Santibanez et al., 2014).

Composition: little literature on the prescribed numerical composition of school councils (whatever they are called) in terms of age, gender, social class, wealth, etc.; and there is very little literature indeed on how many of each group attend the meetings. Because of this situation, our focus will be broader: looking at frequency and attendance at meetings; responsibilities, issues discussed and effective decisions taken; as well as on a wide range of possible outcomes.

Outcomes: the scope of outcomes considered will also be broad including not only test scores, failure/pass rates, drop-out rates and enrolment rates but also student and teacher attendance and school-community relations.

2. Introducing school-based management and school councils

2.1 What Are School Councils?

School-based management within state systems has been in place in developed countries with diverse educational systems, for over 30 years; with reforms in several developing countries being relatively recent. SBM can be broadly defined as decentralization of authority from the central or state governments to the school level (Caldwell, 2005) – although, according to Hanson (1998), almost all management decisions retain some form of centralisation - and reforms are far from uniform, being shaped by the broader national policy and the social context. Typically, the devolution of decision-making has two dimensions to it: the extent of autonomy devolved, and the people to whom the authority for decision-making is devolved.

Most SBM reforms involve some sort of transfer of responsibility and decision making- usually the responsibility of school operations- to a combination of head teachers, teachers, parents and other community members. Most programs work through a School Council, which may have one or more of the following responsibilities to: define composition of school management team; define curricula, course plans and select textbooks; monitor school performance, for example, with internal or external tests, or teacher and student attendance; appoint or dismiss teachers and sometimes set their salaries; define student admission requirements, set disciplinary policy; ensure

that teacher salaries are paid on time; define school budgets, allocate resources and make appropriate investment; and examine financial statements (Galiani et al., 2008).

2.2 Origin and Rationales

The conventional perspective on origins is that they started in the USA in the late 1980s and were then adopted in Latin America (first in El Salvador). In the US, there had been swings between decentralisation and centralisation for a long time but as White (1989) says:

> *"Previous attempts to decentralize were aimed at shifting authority from a large, central board of education to smaller, local boards...replacing one form of bureaucracy with another. Past reforms avoided a transfer of power to the school site....SBM is different....it changes the entire system of district and school organization and restructures most roles in the district" (p. 2).*

In developing countries, many authors (e.g. Barr, Bategaka et al., 2012) report that service delivery has suffered, in great part, from the "weakness of accountability mechanisms between school administrators, teachers and the communities" (p.i). Whilst teachers' unions may have objected, parental participation is seen as a better option for three reasons:

(a) Information can be more easily shared at the local than the government level so that planning may be more efficient.
(b) Communities and parents have a strong incentive to demand better quality service for their children, usually through more efficient monitoring of the provider.
(c) Finally, parents who participate in school management may find out important information about the school (e.g. the possibility of reduced fees), information on the returns to education, and about school functioning. The increased parental confidence in the school staff could make them more confident about enrolling their children and more pro-active in their child's education (Beasley and Huillery, 2014).

2.3 Why are they Increasingly Implemented?

Devolving decision-making authority to the local level can improve communication, transparency, and accountability (especially when government monitoring of provision is difficult), making teachers and school principals more responsible for better performance and more capable of bringing it about. Beneficiary participation is more likely to improve the quality of the service through a more efficient monitoring of the provider; communities have a stronger incentive to demand high quality service since they benefit directly from the service; parents participation in school management increasing parental confidence in school staff (Beasley and Huillery, 2014); teachers know their students and communities much better than removed administrators (Reimers and Cardenas, 2007). Formally, Eskeland and Filmer (2002) postulate that greater autonomy increases the 'rent' available to all the stakeholders at the school level – i.e., what they can expect in terms of increased welfare -and specifically that parental participation (a constructed index – see Appendix 2) plays a role in directing part of this to families through increased learning.

Autonomy and community involvement also allow community members to adapt schools to local conditions and to experiment with what works and adjust provision based on how well they are perceived to meet local objectives; higher quality becomes possible because there is a better match between supply and demand and the increased accountability of the service providers to the local community (Di Gropello, 2007); and the benefits of local control include greater community ownership and acceptance of schools (World Bank, 2004, p. 112). The nature of the compact between policymakers/politicians and providers referring to "how well and how clearly

the responsibilities and objectives of public engagement are communicated to the public and to private organizations that provide services" (World Development Report, 2004, p. 113) is important (Fiszbein, 2005).

Finally, where the decentralisation involves some kind of support by the parents to the schools, this reduces the financial burden on the State.

2.4 How Are They Related to Accountability in Education? And to PTAs?

Whether or not decentralization efforts makes schools respond more effectively to parents and communities depends on parents' information about school performance and the mechanisms available to express opinions to responsible decision makers (Winkler, 2005). It cannot be assumed that parental 'voice' will be effective and a driver of accountability in all contexts: parents do not always have the ability to make their voices heard and decentralisation can allow local elites to capture the benefits of public resources (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005; Reinikka and Svensson 2004). The details of design and implementation are crucial.

2.5 Issues of Inequity between Richer and Poorer Communities

First, decentralisation through privatisation with competition between schools and parental choice of schools are unlikely to improve access and school performance for poorly equipped families or for poor rural areas. (Angrist et al., 2001; Gauri, 1999).

Second, the role of community participation in publicly funded schools is likely to vary greatly depending on the context; it is important to make explicit the role of power imbalances between the beneficiaries and the service provider. Thus, parental education may determine real authority in two ways: first, school committees with more education are able to perform tasks requiring basic literacy and numeracy; second, education is an important determinant of social status.

In Gambia, Blimpo and Evans (2011) found no impact on learning outcomes from SMC training and a grant to initiate school improvement plans, except in communities where SMC members were more educated. This was in spite of clear increases in parental participation across all communities. Beasley and Huillery (2014) report similar findings in Niger, where increased supervision of teacher attendance was only found in the more educated communities. Indeed,, decentralization can increase inequality and reduce learning for disadvantaged students (Umansky and Vegas, 2007).

3. School council composition and responsibilities

This section describes the constitutional and legal position of school councils and where available the common patterns of school council composition; frequency of and attendance at meetings; responsibilities and roles and decision-making devolved to schools both *de jure* and *de factor*; issues discussed in school council meetings; parental participation in councils and school activities; between and within community inequalities; and makes an overall assessment of the success of school- based management interventions.

3.1 School Council Composition

Constitution: In nearly all countries the establishment of a SC or SMC is mandated in national laws or in regulations from the Ministries of Education; the only countries where this does not appear to be the case (only because it is not mentioned) are Guinea, Kenya and Tanzania. In most cases parents are *de jure* in the majority, with the principal always acting as the Chair or Secretary, and with one or more teachers often included. Where community representatives or current or ex- students are included, there tends to be only one of each category,

the exception being Indonesia and Uganda. Examples of numerical composition are included in the matrix for Ghana, Niger, South Africa, Uganda; India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka; Indonesia; and Guatemala and Honduras; but these may be 'on paper' numbers only (see below). In addition, many schools may also have parents associations that may or may not be formally involved in the school council (Santibanez et al., 2014), for example through a parent representative.

Frequency of and Attendance at Meetings: there are very few national censuses or sample surveys of schools which document the frequency of and attendance at meetings. The only countries where there appear to have been national surveys are Ghana and Uganda, both organised by the World Bank; but typically, there are 4 meetings scheduled per year, although they may not always happen (indeed several studies report that there are only occasional meetings). Attendance is recorded or solicited very rarely (only 5 countries have any data) with some suggestion that there is much higher attendance at PTAs than at SMCs, although the latter is extremely variable from 9% in Ghana to 74% in Uganda (see matrix).

Parental Participation: As background, we first describe the results from the recent OECD PISA survey (2012). These show (their Figure IV.4.7, p.142) that reported participation in Local School Councils is considerably higher in most of the partner countries than the OECD average of 11%: with Argentina 18%, Brazil 21%, Columbia 51%, Indonesia 53%, Peru 48%, Thailand 18%, Uruguay 10% and Vietnam 24%. These are mostly Upper Middle Income countries (with GNIs per capita ranging from US$4,870 for Peru to US$11,010 for Brazil) with the exception of Indonesia and Vietnam which are Lower Middle Income (GNI per capita 3,010 and 1,390 respectively) and Uruguay which is classified as a High Income country (GNI per capita US$12,000) and is the only country reported to be at the OECD average.

Comparison with the OECD PISA results (Figure IV.4.8, p.143) also shows that participation in various types of school activities is generally higher in the partner countries (as above) as compared to the OECD average, except where one would expect the activity to be more typical of a developed country (volunteering in a school library, assisting teacher and being a guest speaker). The average across OECD countries was 4% volunteering in physical activities and 1% helping in the school canteen, whilst the comparable figures were 9% and 6% in Argentina, 2% and 1% in Brazil, 13% and 6% in Columbia, 21% and 6% in Indonesia, 16% and 3% in Peru, 13% and 7% in Thailand, 3% and 0% in Uruguay and 13% and 2% in Vietnam. Once again, Uruguay is below the OECD average and so is Brazil which was the highest income country in the Upper Middle Income group.

In developing countries, variations in the levels of participation can be attributed to the interplay between factors relating to school administration and factors concerning parents' level of education, income, gender, individual expectations and attitudes toward participation. In general, there appear to be differences in the motivation and participation of parents in rural and urban areas, with usually greater participation in rural areas; and between men and women, with often greater participation by women in school activities although women are much less likely to be formal members of the committee/ council. But this can be changed: '… a remote rural village in Ghana, had regular PTA meetings that were well attended by fathers but rarely by mothers. [The women] also thought the PTA was 'men's business'. The headmaster changed to a suggested time: "Fridays right after prayers because both Muslims and Christians don't go to farm on those days and it is before cooking begins."' (UNICEF 2009, Chap.4, p.17).

There are some apparently strange effects (see Box 1).

Box 1: Blimpo and Evans Gambia

For example, in Gambia, the WSD treatment has a negative effect on parents' attendance to PTA meetings and school invitations. On average, parents attended 0.41 less meetings in the WSD group than in the Control group (their Table 11, column VII). The possible explanation may be that the WSD creates six sub-committees within the community to deal with different challenges pertaining to the functioning of the school; and parents may think those committees are in full charge and therefore they can be less involved.

3.2 Responsibilities of, and Issues actually Discussed at, School Councils

Responsibilities and decision-making devolved to the schools both *de jure* and *de facto*: All formally constituted School Councils have at least influence and often authority over (part of) the non-salary budget of the school, and this is nearly always exercised; they are frequently mandated to develop a 3-5 year School Improvement Plan and an Annual Work Plan, although the extent to which these are put into practice is variable; and *de facto* it is assumed that they will help with infrastructure and maintenance. Some councils are given the responsibility of hiring and firing teachers and especially non-permanent contract teachers (e.g. in India, Kenya, Madagascar; see Box 2); and some have pastoral duties in terms of ensuring the discipline of learners and staff and school-level conflict resolution.

Box 2: Contractual Teachers in Madagascar

Every school in Madagascar has a Parents Association (FRAM) responsible for hiring and managing contractual teachers. FRAM representatives are elected by parents during a general assembly held annually. Although tuition fees have been abolished, FRAM are allowed to raise local contributions, mainly to cover the salary of contractual teachers. FAF and FRAM are the two formal channels through which parents can voice their concerns and complaints to the school authorities. (Lesne, 2013).

The authority by EDUCO school councils to hire and fire teachers was found to be an important factor in EDUCO students' better outcomes as compared with traditional schools serving similar populations in El Salvador (Sawada, 1999).

None of the studies demonstrate a clear relation between the composition and regulations governing the formation of the school council and their responsibilities; and although the qualitative studies in Central America (Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) asked relevant questions (see Appendix 4), their reporting does not clarify this issue.

Issues actually discussed: One would have thought that the responsibilities prescribed to the School Council would be the main agenda topics at their meetings; but the (very little) evidence - only reported for studies in India, Kenya and Niger - does not support this obvious inference. Instead, the only topics apparently discussed are attendance and learning and discipline.

3.3 How the Social, Economic, Cultural and Political Context affects Implementation

Who is Included in School Councils: The mandated composition does not appear to vary between countries with parents being in the majority, with the single exception of Uganda where the banning of PTAs in 2008 appears to be reflected in the formal composition of the School Council, where only one in 12 of the mandated members is a parent. The actual attendance and effective participation of different groups is rarely reported.

What affects Level of Autonomy: Gunnarson et al. (2008) based on an analysis of variations in autonomy, participation and input shortages (all based on constructed indexes – see Appendix 3) across 10 Latin American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela):

(a) shows that 95% of variation in autonomy, 96% in participation and 82% in input shortages occur within countries and not between countries implying that the exercise of local authority is largely a local choice only modestly influenced by constitutional stipulations regarding jurisdiction over school personnel, curriculum and facilities.
(b) hypothesises and demonstrates that there is endogeneity (inter-dependence) of autonomy and school performance so that the actual practice of autonomy is more likely in schools that are performing better; and, as a corollary, that ordinary least squares regression estimates are biased toward finding a positive impact of school autonomy on student performance.

In general, the study suggests that devolution of power to local schools cannot be accomplished by central mandates, but must take into account local incentives and local capacity to manage schools. A specific example of how these factors play out is provided by Gershberg et al. (2009), who examined local governance in Guatemala through interviews with a range of stakeholders; and discussed the importance of local context in determining the success of decentralisation reforms. They found that: giving parents the authority to allocate a small portion of funding has provided parents a greater sense of ownership and pride of their schools and allowed them to use the funding in ways that fit community preferences and interests; the combination of using NGOs as intermediaries to establish schools with community control in rural areas had led to increases in coverage and attendance, as well as improvement in other aspects of accountability; and teacher turnover is three times higher in PRONADE than in official schools in comparison to EDUCO in neighbouring El Salvador.

3.4 Presumed Success of Decentralisation

Determinants of Success of Decentralisation: Van den Berg and Van Noort (2011) provide a comprehensive list of the potential limitations: insufficient parental participation, limited capacity of SMCs translates into limited impact, on school governance, unclear lines of authority and procedures, inadequate administrative and pedagogical support of teachers, limited transparency and accountability at the school level; and communities are positive if their preferred project was implemented (Heinrich and Lopez, 2007).

Di Gropello and Marshall (2005) outline several possible efficiency gains with community schools. Teachers may be directly paid at the school level, which avoids having to travel to state or municipal capitals to retrieve paychecks. Infrastructure or learning resource problems are resolved locally, as they arise, instead of going through the local, state or national level. A more streamlined business model also means less time in administrative activities, which can in turn maximize the teacher's work hours in the classroom, or preparing for class. Comparing community schools with traditional schools, Umansky and Vegas (2005) showed that, in both El Salvador and Honduras teachers absences are less and they work longer hours in the community schools, and in EL Salvador the teachers are more qualified (although they have less experience than in Honduras), although there is no discussion of the reaction of their unions. Finally, parent supervisors can instigate additional procedural changes in areas such as the school climate. For example, when children are complaining of mistreatment, parents may put pressure on school personnel to remedy the situation.

There are four reasons why these kinds of efficiency gains may not be realized, or why decentralized control may not automatically translate into higher relative levels of student learning. First, , the success of decentralization initiatives in practice can be affected by the wider institutional and political setting; so that the devolution of

control to parent councils and communities may not go as smoothly as intended, or it may be carried out to achieve goals other than maximizing teaching and learning efficiency. Teachers and school administrators may not like these arrangements, and they and their unions may chafe under a management regime that expects more from them than in traditional schools. Local empowerment can also amplify existing conflicts between different entities that may themselves be products of complicated social, cultural and political forces (Fuller and Rivarola, 1998). Second, the success of decentralization is also heavily dependent on local capacity (Carnoy, 1995). This becomes especially true when parent councils are given more power to run schools. In many of these communities, education levels are low, which raises questions about the ability of parents to recognize – let alone ameliorate – teacher deficiencies in less readily-observable elements of their work, such as content knowledge or methods. Furthermore, despite their power over teachers through the payment and recruitment functions, parents may not feel comfortable entering into very specific areas of the teacher's work (Marshall, 2004). Thus, decentralised decision-making may not improve school quality (Galiani et al., 2008), when parents cannot make their voices heard or when SMCs are not technically able to administer schools. Third, there is the budget constraint: the principal goal of the parent council may be to provide a functional school at a price that the community can afford, and not necessarily the best school possible. Fourth, there are any number of cultural and economic factors that play a role in determining the demand for education in predominantly poor and rural areas (Kochar 2004). For example, because of difficulties in recruiting capable teachers in these areas, efficiency gains may be offset by deficiencies in teacher capacity (Di Gropello and Marshall, 2005), although teachers' unions may object.

4. Conclusion / Summary

Composition: Several of the studies report on the mandated composition of parents, ex-students, teachers, local government, education officials; but only rarely on the actual attendance or effective participation of each of those groups. In terms of parental participation there is usually greater participation in rural areas; and greater participation by women in school activities although women are much less likely to be formal members of the committee/ council.

Council Responsibilities and Issues actually Discussed: As can be seen from the matrix, the mandated responsibilities are often clearly specified, including authority over (part of) the non-salary budget of the school; to develop a 3-5 year School Improvement Plan and an Annual Work Plan, although the extent to which these are put into practice is variable. One would have thought that the responsibilities prescribed to the School Council would be the main agenda topics at their meetings; but where the issues actually discussed are reported, the only topics apparently discussed are attendance and learning and discipline.

Factors affecting Implementation: There are several factors that have to be taken into account in addition to those cited above: these include not only the wider context but also local capacity and the involvement of teachers in the design and implementation of the decentralisation programme, including the role of teachers' unions.

Table 1: Matrix with Summary Findings from each country

				COUNCIL COMPOSITION, TRAINING, ACTIVITIES		MEETINGS: FREQUENCY, ATTENDANCE, ISSUES			
REGION, Country	**Main Source Article(s)**	**Programme**	**Implemen-tation**	**Teacher/ Parents**	**Trained**	**Visits /Classes/ month**	**Fre-quen-cy**	**Average Attendance**	**Issues Discussed**
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA									
Gambia	Blimpo & Evans	WSD	Experiment 273 schools		Mentor		4/ year		
Ghana	World Bank; Attrams Stone	WSD etc.; SMC more important than PTA	Effective 70%	SMCs 10 (HT, 2T, 3 LG); PTAs 9 (HT, 6 P)				PTAs 96%; SMCs 11% R, 5% U PTAs 97%, SMCs 8%	
Kenya	Duflo et al	ETP+SBM	Experiment		Yes ½ day		4/ year		Attendance / learning
Madagascar	Lassible	Report Cards + Training	Experiment 30 D, 466 SD		2 days	No			
Niger	Beasley & Huillery	COGES pilot grants	Experiment	SD + 5 Elected parents	Some, variable ??	Super-vision	4-5/ year		Supervision at distance; Discipline
South Africa	Carr-Hill & Muthayan	Evaluation of IMBEWU	Evaluation	Average 8 elected	3-4 days in program		4/ Year		
Tanzania	OPM	EQUIP	Baseline						
Uganda	Najjumba et al.; Muwanga	National Survey; thesis	204 schools	6 appointed; 1T, 1P, 3LG	4/ SMC for 2 days			SMCs 74% PTAs 62%F, 70%M	Budget (31%) Dev.Plan (17%) Perform. (14%)
SOUTH ASIA									
India	Banerjee et al.; Pandey et al.	Information Campaigns	Evaluation 05-06/06-09	9-14 on EC in K. and MP chaired by parent; inc. HT, 3 parents; UP 5 members			K: 4/ year		Attendance/ Learning

Sri Lanka	World Bank	PSI & SCRP		3-5 parents?			Mon-thly		
WEST ASIA									
Pakistan	Habib; USAID	Community; SMCs, PTCs	132 Int's 350 schools Punjab	3 T, 3 Local, 3 P > 50% parents	3 days		6/ year	>50%, ave. 70%	
EAST ASIA & PACIFIC									
Indonesia	Pradhan et al; Bandur	Grant, election linkage,	Experiment; Survey	Min. 9, max. 3 T; no limit ctty					
Philippines	World Bank								
CENTRAL AMERICA									
Guatemala	Gershberg et al; Poppema	PRONADE; PROESCOLAR	Survey	7: SD, 1 T, 3 P (2 literate)	ISE gives 6 days/year			NO females	
Honduras	Di Gropello & Marshall	PROHECO		6		Fewer T. meetings			
Mexico	Gertler et al.; Santibanez	AGE; PEC-FIDE		Yes					
Nicaragua	Gershberg&Meade; King&Ozler	PRONADE; NERA							
LATIN AMERICA									
Argentina	Eskeland&Filmer							4.7% parents regularly participate	
Chile	Weinstein et al; LaFuente&Razinsky		Only on paper						
El Salvador	Jiminez & Sawada	EDUCO				4.9 vs 1.3 5.7 vs 1.6			
Venezuela	Allcott & Ortega	Fe y Alegria		Serendipitous					

NOTES ON ABBREVIATIONS IN COLUMNS. *Programme*: ETP = Extra Teacher Programme; WSD = Whole School Development; Implementation: D = District, SD = Sub-District; Int's = Interviews, D = District, SD Sub-District. Teacher/ Parents: HT = Head-teacher, SD = School Director, T = Teacher(S), P = Parent(S), LG = Local Government. Attendance: PTAs = Parent Teacher Associations, SMCs = School Management Councils, R = Rural, U = Urban

REGION		RESPONSIBILITY PRESCRIBED	POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT		IMPACT ON PERFORMANCE
COUNTRY	**Main Sources**		**School-Community Relations**	**Actual Power**	
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA					
Gambia	Blimpo & Evans				No impact on test scores, except in areas with higher adult literacy. Student and teacher absenteeism Neg. (25% to 20% and 13% to 10%, respectively)
Ghana	World Bank; Attrams	Sp of PC Budget; SDP	Poor 51%/56%		English & Maths JSS Pos. SPAM no longer active
Guinea	Garnier et al., '05	H & F	Increased cooperation boards & local officials	Parents Assoc. more confident	Improvement in Admin. Procedures and Documents kept by Board Actions to improve quality; Enrolment P 25% vs 13% Success Rural 16% vs 11%; 21% vs 7%
Kenya	Duflo et al.	H & F; SDP			Teacher attendance Pos.; Student Achievement Pos. 0.19 SD; Reduces corruption in hiring Contract Teachers
Madagascar	Lassibile; Lesne				School attendance, reduced grade repetition, outcomes in Malagasy & Mathematics ALL Pos.; Very weak measurement of participation.
Niger	Beasley & Huillery (use section 8.5)	H & F; Sp of PC Budget; SDP	SCs support manage-ment actions and parent participation	Teachers	SC supervises pupil & teacher attendance: Not educated enough to sanction teachers (lack of real authority). Enrolment Pos., Drop-out Neg. in Grades 1 & 2 (demand more elastic). Parental. Ptcpn > material quality
Nigeria	Ikoya		Accountability improves, corruption reduced		Decentralisation P availability, adequacy, functionality of physical facilities
South Africa	Joubert	H & F; Sp of PC Budget; SDP	Review showing wide variation	Principal+ Teachers	CS in 29 schools: 10 (white, Indian, coloured) well-functioning; 12 mixed, 7 ineffective. Poor excluded.
Tanzania	OPM			Teachers	
Uganda	Muwange; Najjjmba et al; Barr et al	H & F (47%); Sp. of PC Budget (22%); SDP 3711% E ????	Volunteers 48% M, 33% F; SIP discussed w/ parents 41%???		Student and teacher absenteeism reduced 9% and 13% respectively; Test Scores Pos. 0.19 SD
SOUTH ASIA					
India	Banerjee; Galab;				Only intervention 3 (reading camps) +22% in reading

	Pandey et al.	H & F; Sp of PC Budget; (all 3 States); SDP (KP only)			SMC attendance (62% vs 26%) and effectiveness +; student and teacher attendance+; student performance + MP: 11%+ N of visits higher for non-SC/ST and men; 9% + teacher attendance, 27%+ teacher activity. UP: 25%+ N of meetings, school visits; impact larger on non-SC and females; 12%+ teacher attendance. KP: no impact on participation but on awareness; no impact on teachers (already high at baseline). Maths + in all three States
Sri Lanka	World Bank	Sp of PC Budget; SDP			Test scores Pos. for PSI intervention
WEST ASIA					
Pakistan	Das Habib USAID				No effect on teacher absenteeism or facilities index; but proportion of council members whose children were attending the managed school significantly increased; Student results 68.5 vs 51; parents Pos. about SCs High female teacher absenteeism solved by SMC providing transport
EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC					
Indonesia	Pradhan				Test scores +0.22 SD for linkage (community)+election
Philippines	Khattri et al World Bank Yamauchi	Sp of PC Budget; SDP	Improved SIP	1 year imple-mentation	Scores Pos. 1.2 Maths, 1.4 English, 1.8 Science. Note R squareds very low; Inequality in school resources up; inequality in test scores down SBM Pos. 5.7 Maths, 4.2 English, 4.7 Science
CENTRAL AMERICA					
Guatemala	Gershberg & Meade Poppema	H & F; Sp of PC Budget; SDP	Context matters Animosity COEDUCA members & teachers	Maya schools disappearing	
Honduras	Di Gropello; Di Gropeelo & Marshall Heinrich & Lopez	H & F; Sp of PC Budget; SDP	Participation Index 1.8 (vs 1.6) Opinions very pos. if project implemented	School Council	PROHECO less group work, question and answer. Maths & Science test scores Pos. Raw 0.13, 0.22 respectively. Teacher Absenteeism reduced (1.5 vs 1.7). School open more frequently; Less fighting in schools. But teachers are less qualified, complain about delays in payment. Classroom processes and teaching not different. No diff on test scores, grade repetition or attendance

Mexico	Bando; Gertler et al; Murnane; Reimers & Cardenas; Santibanez Skoufias & Schapiro	 Sp of PC Budget Sp of PC Budget; SDP	 AGE generated and facilitated dialogue PEC positively influences non-PEC sch. QSP unlikely in Schools w/weak organisational capacity	 More coordination	Pos. Vol'y Contributions, more in marginal communities; Pos. in Maths (0.07 SD) and Spanish (0.05 SD); Neg. on drop-out and failure rates Pos. on grade failure and grade repetition; many PTAs dysfunctional Drop-out rate Neg. 0.27 percentage points; but no impact on student failure or on over-age students QSP no different from NON-QSP schools at different socio-economic levels Spanish test scores Pos. 28pts about ½ SD Drop-out, failure Neg. 0.24; repetition Neg. 0.31
Nicaragua	Fuller & RivarolA King & Ozler Parker		Schools in poor areas can't raise revenues *De jure* vs *De facto* autonomy		Cohesive schools work not fractured schools *De facto* admin autonomy Pos. for Maths (1.4) & Spanish (1.0) in Primary Treatment effect for mathematics Pos. for 3rd grade, Neg. for 6th grade
LATIN AMERICA					
Argentina	Eskeland & Filmer Galianai	H & F; Sp of PC Budget; SDP			Maths P with autonomy & interaction of autonomy with participation, stronger for poorer schools, students. Maths& Spanish Pos. but only in non-poor areas
Brazil	Carnoy et al Guerrero		 *De facto* works		Grade-passing Pos.
Chile	La Fuente		Trust in school guides parent choice		
El Salvador	Jiminez and Sawada Sawada & Ragetz	H & F; Sp of PC Budget; SDP		Parents influence decisions 1.4 (vs 0.4) on 0-3 scale	Language scores; Student attendance Pos.; Enrollment Pos., Retention Pos., Repetition Neg. Teacher effort increases; e.g. meetings w/parents hrs /month 4.9 (vs 2.9). ACE/SpDF visits, 5.7/1.4 per month; these latter affect P maths and language
Venezuela					0.25 SD for poorest quintile; 0.05 for top quintile

NOTES FOR ABBREVIATIONS IN COLUMNS. *Responsibility Prescribed*: H & F = Hiring and Firing Teachers; Sp of PC = Spend of per capita; SDP = School Development Plan. *Impact on Performance:* Pos. = Positive. Neg. =Negative; Ptcpn = Participation; SD = Standard Deviation.

5. Effectiveness of School councils

This section contains vignettes from 6 countries covering variations in school councils, composition, responsibilities and actual functionality and the effect that has on student achievement, transparency and community trust. As far as is possible, each one includes the mandated roles and responsibilities of the school council and evidence on their effectiveness. There is some evidence on the extent to which the functionality of the school councils moderates effectiveness, but very little on either the impact of the precise composition (either mandated or in practice) or on the allocation of different positions to different groups. There is some evidence on the relations between parents and teachers, but this does not appear to be mediated by the school council's style/orientation. As remarked in the previous section, there are substantial between-school variations within each country.

5.1 Country vignettes

EL SALVADOR: the original model in a low income context; history matters

The EDUCO program was designed to expand rural education rapidly following their civil war. In EDUCO schools, the Community Education Association (ACE) has a central role of school administration and management, responsible for allocation of school budgets and for hiring and dismissing teachers by monitoring teacher's performance (Sawada, 1999). The partnership between MINED and ACEs is expected to improve school administration and management by reflecting local demand needs more appropriately. On the other hand, the parents' associations (Sociedad de Padres de Familia or SdPF) in traditional schools have limited roles: SdPF has no administrative authority over school personnel or the budget. Teacher performance incentives have been introduced here and in Nicaragua.

A baseline survey in 1996 showed that EDUCO schools were worse off in terms of facilities and infrastructure than traditional rural schools and that the socio-economic status of their parents was inferior but that there was no difference in academic achievement in 3rd grade (Umanzor et al., 1997). The authors suggest that this is a consequence of teachers being slightly better qualified, more textbooks are available and parents are more involved in EDUCO schools; parents in EDUCO schools making between 3 and 4 times as many visits per month as in traditional schools and on a 0-3 scale, parents in EDUCO schools influence decisions 1.4 compared to 0.4 in traditional schools.

Based on a principal-agent model, Jiminez and Sawada (1999 and 2003) investigated the organizational structure that made the EDUCO program successful; and examined how decentralizing educational responsibility to communities and Schools affects student outcomes. After controlling for background characteristics and participation bias, there was no difference between EDUCO and traditional schools in standardized mathematics and language tests; however, students were less often absent in EDUCO schools, presumably because parents are more motivated to send their children to schools and are better able to monitor teachers.

GHANA: Contrasting Urban and Rural areas

In the mid-1990s, a policy of free compulsory, universal primary education was launched (FCUBE), and since 1997 education has been decentralised. FCUBE includes improving quality of teaching and learning with one of the components being teacher incentives (OED, 2004, p.10). This vignette is based on a subsequent World Bank national survey. Ninety percent of primary schools have a PTA. There is considerable variation in the extent to which PTAs have provided support to schools and in the value of parents' monthly contributions: several schools not requesting or receiving a PTA contribution compared to the maximum of 150,000 cedis per child ($20).

Parents report attending PTA meetings "very often" more than for any other measure of involvement in school. Such meetings are said to be mandatory for parents who may attend to avoid penalties (Chowa, Ansong et al. 2012), but there is no further information as to the type of penalties (financial or exclusion), or on whether or not they improve attendance or whether or not they apply to all groups of parents.

Eighty percent of the schools surveyed also had a School Management Committees. However, in only half of schools had SMCs met in the preceding month or provided support in the past year, and in even fewer had they helped the school in dealings with outside agencies. Community knowledge of the PTA and SMC both matter for the level of the contribution. The implication is that where these school management organizations are active in the community, each household feels more inclined to make a contribution and that contribution is larger. For most of the questions asked, the PTA was seen as a more supportive organization by Primary and Secondary schools (87% and 89% compared to SMCs 38% and 62%). School respondents reported PTAs to be more active in urban areas, though there was no difference for SMCs.

Virtually all public primary schools (92%) also have had a School Performance Assessment Meeting (SPAM), at 98 percent of which an action plan was agreed. The most common actions agreed at the SPAM were (note that it was a teacher replying to the survey) that parents should ensure children attend school (41%) and parents should provide pencils and exercise books (38%). The most common actions for teachers were to provide extra classes (33%) and to be punctual (17%). Problems of absenteeism were mentioned by less than 10 percent of respondents. Responsibility for implementation of the action plan was seen to rest with the head teacher (47%) or the circuit supervisor (24%). In only 20% were the PTA or SMC said to be responsible; although in only 42 percent were they claimed to have been carried out completely.

At the household level, rural households were more likely to know about and participate in PTAs than in SMCs and even more than in SPAM; knowledge of SMCs and the SPAM is far less common than the school-level data suggests it should be, and participation rates correspondingly low, with only 6% of households reporting having attended a SPAM at their child's school. Rural communities may be easier to mobilize in support of schools, but they also tend to be less well off, reducing their ability to provide financial support; in some cases making no financial contribution to the schools.

Chowa, Ansong et al (2012) also reports on parental involvement in 100 schools selected randomly from eight of Ghana's ten regions. A majority (87%) report *ever* having attended a PTA meeting at some time: and, *in the last year*, those with education above their children's are more likely to report attending PTAs (39%) compared to those with lower education (30%). There is no difference by gender or by Math or English grade of the parent.

INDIA: Information matters

PTAs are meant to be present in every government school in India; they are supposed to monitor learning, and manage and oversee school funding (Pandey et al., 2011). They are directed to monitor teacher performance and verify teacher attendance in order for the release of teachers' monthly salaries. It can make school visits and register complaints with district or block education offices. Resources have been allocated regularly through the government's flagship programme for elementary education, Sarva Skhiksa Abhiyan (SSA), for training of school committees. Duflo et al. (2009) also found in Kenya that giving school committees resources to hire local teachers resulted in higher test scores, and training them in their monitoring role enhanced that effect.

This vignette evaluates a community based randomized controlled trial (RCT) to determine the impact of an information campaign on learning and other school outcomes in Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh (MP) and Uttar Pradesh (UP) (Pandey, Goyal et al., 2011). At baseline, 52% of parent members of committees in UP and 58% in

MP could not list a single role for the committee; only 2% in UP and 8% MO had received any training; and teacher attendance was 65% in UP and 67% in MP (p.26).

The film intervention included a poster and calendar focused on: details of roles and responsibilities of school oversight committees; rules for selection of members of these committees; rules for committee meetings; number of mandatory meetings, minimum attendance requirements for meetings; record keeping of minutes; organization and funding of school accounts; right to information regarding the school including right to obtain copies of any school record; where to complain about any problems; benefits that students in primary grades are entitled to such as cash stipend, textbooks, midday meal, school uniforms. A Learning Assessment Booklet outlined the Minimum Levels of Learning (MLL) and parents could use it to find out whether their children had learnt what they should.

After 24 months, committee meetings (although there was no evidence on member attendance) and member participation in visits to schools had increased by 25%; and there was also an 11% increase in visits to school by committees in MP, with the impact larger on non-SCs/STs in both, and for females in UP and males in MP (Pandey, Goal et al., 2011, pp.27-29). Teacher attendance increased by 12% in UP and 9% in MP, and there was a 27% increase in teacher activity in MP; the impacts were greater on civil service teachers (teacher attendance increasing by 23% in UP and 16% in MP; with a 45% increase in teacher activity in MP), and especially on upper caste male teachers (pp.30-31). In KP, there was no impact on participation but on awareness; and no impact on teachers which were already high at baseline (p.36).

A year after the intervention, focussed groups were held in UP and MP and the resident participants were interviewed. Teacher attendance was raised with the school or an education official by only 25% of Scheduled Castes (SC)/Scheduled Tribes (ST) compared to 42% of non-SC/ST. Communities approached teachers of Chairs directly, bypassing other members of the committees, with more than 70% going with other parents rather than by themselves (over 90% of SCs/STs), although 70% of committee members went alone. Parents reported that 35%-40% of teachers reacted angrily. When those who used the Learning Assessment Booklet tried to discuss it with the teacher, 67% of SCs/STs reported angry reactions from the teachers compared to 46% non-SCs/STs. In contrast, committee members reported no angry reactions from the teachers (Pandey, Goyal et al., 2011, p.35).

Students were assessed in school on a simple competency based language and mathematics test. The impacts were mainly in mathematics competencies, in grades 3 and 4 in UP and in grade 5 in MP. This may be because: acquiring basic math skills can be easier if it is not significantly dependent on the language skills of the student; national or state-level tests include written problems. In both MP and UP, there are more significant impacts in villages with low fractions of SC/ST populations (i.e., with high fractions of non-SC/ST or upper caste populations); and more significant impacts in villages with low literacy rates, particularly in MP. An explanation for this result can be that villages with low literacy rates have a greater demand for schooling (Pandey, Goyal et al., 2011, p.34).

In Karnataka, the impacts on learning between baseline and second follow-up were in mathematics with no impacts on language competencies. There were more significant impacts in villages with high fractions of SC/ST populations and high literacy rates, in contrast to the other two states. Karnataka has a longer history of affirmative action in favour of disadvantaged caste groups who may, therefore, have a greater political voice; a longer history of decentralization; and high literacy rates are more likely to translate into efficient and active use of information when local governance structures are functional.

INDONESIA: Contrast Policy and Implementation
This vignette reports on three studies in different parts of Indonesia.

Bandur (2008) interviewed 504 school council members at 42 primary schools in Ngala District in 2007 and held semi-structured interviews with one of the members in each school. School boards have a minimum of 9 members with a maximum of 3 representatives from teachers, school foundations and Village government but no limit on number of community representatives; their major roles are to formulate and approve school budget; school quality control; develop partnerships with external organisations to improve learning; and maintain buildings and school facilities. Less than 3% of the councillors viewed the processes either as poor or unsatisfactory.

Vernez et al. (2012) surveyed principals, teachers and School Council members in 54 randomly chosen districts out of 470 in 2010 with 2% of schools within those districts randomly sampled; and a test of Bahasa and mathematics was administered in one 5th grade class in each school. Most principals perceived that they had more or less complete autonomy - even over the hiring and firing of civil service teachers although that had remained the prerogative of central government – although they did not take advantage of it to make programmatic or instructional changes. Most districts continued to have a high level of influence, for example in the choice of textbooks and curriculum, and also indicated by the almost complete uniformity in stated goals and priorities and actions taken to improve student performance. Principals nearly always consulted the Districts before taking a decision. School Council members rarely met, the SC Chair simply being asked to sign off on decisions already made; and the members attitudes was of non-interference with school matters and deference to the teaching staff; but they also said that they received very little information about the school. Parents were also deferential; external transparency and accountability were weak; and principals and teachers reported that they felt no or little pressure.

Overall principals, teachers and SC members had insufficient understanding of SBM and the functions attributed to the SC. Districts claimed that they offered training on SBM, the B OS programme, school planning and instruction; but over half of principals and over two-thirds of teachers reported that they had had no training in the past year or that it was insufficient. Higher self-reported principal preparedness and certified teachers were associated with increased student achievement. Neither the level of implementation of SBM nor the share of discretionary funds applied to instruction had any effect on school achievement.

Pradhan et al. (2011) allocated schools randomly to either a control group receiving no intervention, or to treatment groups receiving a grant plus one or a combination of three interventions: training for school committee members, a democratic election of school committee members, or facilitated (and controlled) collaboration between the school committee and the village council to develop a school expenditure plan (called linkage). Compliance with intervention assignment was relatively good, with the exception of the election intervention. He finds no effect on drop-out or repetition but test scores in Bahasa improve by 0.17 SD for linkage and 0.22 for linkage + election.

Pradhan et al. (2011) conclude that elements that support existing school management committees are unlikely to have an effect, whereas elements that introduce new participants (e.g. elections and linkage) are likely to substantially impact outcomes.

MEXICO: Cash is the Key
AGE (Apoyo a Gestion Escolar) introduced in 1996/97 as part of broader Compensatory Reform programme (itself started in 1992), originally targeted at highly disadvantaged rural areas, finances and supports parents' associations through training, and motivates parental participation by involving them in the management of the

school grants, in exchange for parental commitment to be more involved in school affairs. The grants were between US$500-$700 per year to be spent on civil works and infrastructure (not salaries or contract teachers). Like all School-Based Management programmes, AGE presumes schools oversee all 5 year school development programmes and a 1 year work programme. Parents associations also exist in most schools but are often dysfunctional. Gertler et al. (2012) found that the AGE program increased the participation of parents in monitoring school performance and decision-making, had reduced drop-out rates by between 1.5-1.7 ppt. A pilot program that doubled the grant had a positive effect on 3rd grade students test score of around 5% in Spanish and 6%-8% in Mathematics.

Eight years after the intervention, Lopez-Calva and Espinosa (2006) found that participating in the AGE program had a positive effect on student test scores in the fourth through sixth grades (in primary school) for both Spanish and math. The authors used a propensity score matching strategy to identify their results. The results are robust to controls for such relevant socioeconomic variables as participation in Mexico's conditional cash transfer program, teacher and school characteristics, and alternative stratification strategies.

PEC/QSP 2001/2: initially targeted to schools disadvantaged urban areas and then to disadvantaged rural areas with grants of US$4,500 volunteering to develop collaboration between principals, teachers and parents for school planning and decision-making with school councils overseeing both school planning activities and their implementation, drafting a five-year School Improvement Plan and a one-year work plan.

Murnane et al. (2006) used data from SY1998 (two years before the programme started) to SY2004 to control for any time trends. They compared primary schools in urban areas that had joined in either the first or second years (PEC 1) with primary schools that had not participated in any of the four years. They examined three school-specific outcomes: the drop-out rate, the failure rate and the percentage of over-age students. Participation in PEC reduced drop-out rate by an average of 0.27 percentage points. They also interviewed 30 individuals involved with the programme about the relationships between state educational authorities and individual school communities, concluding – provisionally because of the small sample – that there had been some improved cooperation between State and federal agencies, not much effective cooperation across departments at state level, but that networks among state educational systems had been reinforced. There is also a common perception that the new approaches and materials that had been developed had benefitted non-PEC schools which leads to an underestimate of the true PEC effect.

PEC-FIDE 2008/09: Santibanez et al. (2014) examine the impact of a spin-off programme from PEC with additional cash grants to schools in six of the Mexican States. They examine effects on drop-out and pass rates and also the test scores from the newly available national testing system (ENLACE - *National Assessment* of Academic Achievement in Schools, a standardized test) using a difference in difference approach, testing for parallel trends before the intervention and test for robustness using a propensity scoring methodology. They find that the intervention improves Spanish test scores in 3rd grade by 28 points, about half a standard deviation. The positive effect was only observed in schools that had not participated in PEC previously, suggesting that the result has been driven by the increased spending and not by better or more inclusive governance structures.

UGANDA: formal structures, little participation

Legally, SMCs are constituted of 12 members: 6 are appointed by the foundation body of the school, including the chairperson and the other 6 include 3 Local government representatives (Najjumba, Habyarimana et al., 2012). There are four distinct roles: (1) financial management of schools, including budget approval and generation of new funding sources; (2) infrastructure and property development management, and maintenance; (3) ensuring the discipline of learners and staff; and (4) school-level conflict resolution; and the 2008 Act added school level goal-setting and planning and "establishing a linkage with the community and

parents". PTAs had had some influence on investment, teacher incentives, teacher transfers, financial management and discipline/ expulsion (Passi, 1995: 219). But PTAs were outlawed in 2008, justified because PTAs were associated with contributions (and their possible political misuse) and weakened parent participation; with free education, parents feel they have no say over a service for which they do not pay (Marphatia, Legault et al., 2010).

Based on a specific SBM survey in 204 randomly selected schools (Najjumba, Habyarimana et al., 2013), only one in 3 SMC members consider school development planning, ensuring transparency of resources and monitoring of programme implementation as their responsibility, only 11% had been involved in approving the school development plan; and only 22% considered that they should elaborate and approve school budgets. Nevertheless participation in school level SMC meetings is high and SMC members report high levels (75%) of satisfaction with these processes, although only 15% felt that there was sufficient information for planning and budgeting. About 75% of schools have a School Improvement Plan (SIP); with higher participation by those with tertiary education; about 20% reported having rejected some elements of the school budget or plans, with very large differences between regions. Issues most likely to be discussed were the school budget and pupil performance at examinations

There is no consistent pattern in school level decision making by either issue or region, allowing for informal and personality based networks to become dominant. A lack of response to school requests for key inputs leads to resignations and compromises on quality. Van Berg and van Noort (2011) also show that, whilst parent committees were present in all schools, their activities and functionality varied considerably between schools. Instead, local leaders as well as religious leaders were used to maintain contact between the community and the schools, although this was not always successful.

Annual meetings with the parents are, in principle, mandated but the Uganda 2009-10 National Household survey showed that only 24% of public schools had such a meeting. This low level of participation is confirmed by van Berg and van Noort (2011) who found that in most schools only a few parents attended those meetings. School level reporting on performance accordingly flows upwards rather than downwards and outwards. School management systems have been largely ineffectual in terms of mobilising parents and community.

Muwanga (2000) showed that rural parents report that they attend more often than urban (81% compared to 56%). Only four of the 50 female parents who responded to the questionnaire survey held leadership positions in their schools; three of those were in urban schools; and they were often relegated to roles that were seen to need "the female touch." such as social affairs or welfare, but rarely to finance or to the chairing of executive committees; other studies have also reported fewer female members but with no further details.

Chaudhury et al. (2006) find no relationship between the frequency of PTA meetings and teacher attendance in Uganda. SMC members' attendance at meetings is uneven, with only key responsibilities - such as the co-signing of school accounts by the SMC Chair - seldom practiced (Guloba and Nyankori, 2010)

Barr et al. (2012b) studied whether community-monitoring interventions were successful because they improve information alone, or do they also need to overcome collective action problems by encouraging parental participation and coordination? They found an estimated average treatment effect of the participatory treatment on attendance — ranging from 8 to 10 percent across specifications — which is economically substantial and statistically significant and also significantly different from standard treatment.

5.2 Other evidence

In addition to countries included in vignettes, parental participation is shown to be important by several other authors. Eskeland and Filmer (2007) show positive effects in Argentina for Maths and Language of Autonomy and the interaction of autonomy and participation (both measured as indexes derived from several variables – see Appendix 2) and that the effects are stronger for poorer students. Di Gropello and Marshall (2011) in Honduras show a positive effect for PROHECO. King and Ozler (2005) show a positive effect for *de facto* but not *de jur*e autonomy in Nicaragua on language and mathematics. In a comparative analysis of school based management reforms in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, Di Gropello (2007) finds that, whilst the reforms have been successful in terms of better use of capacity and increased enrolment, they have done poorly in terms of teacher involvement and that this can only be addressed by positive incorporation of teachers and their unions into the design process. Blimpo and Evans (2011) found that the effect of the WSD program on learning outcomes is strongly mediated by the baseline local capacity measured by adult literacy; but that there was no effect of the Grant-only intervention. Lassibile et al. (2010) in Madagascar, examined an intensive package of report cards, training school-level personnel, sub-district and district administrators finding that it has increased school attendance, reduced grade repetition and outcomes in Malagasy and Mathematics (although the impact on test scores were not significant). Beasley and Huillery (2012) find in Niger that parents readily engage in activities that support the school, especially those parents with higher benefit from enrolling their child and lower cost of participating; parents also engage in activities that help the school staff manage the school; but parents, except those who are educated, have much more difficulty taking actions that directly oppose the teachers. They also found increases in the demand for education which were attributed to the practice of participation, and support this channel by showing that participation accounts for at least some of the variation in demand induced by treatment, while improvements to infrastructure account for almost none. In Nigeria, Ikoya (2009) found that decentralization of physical facilities management enhances the availability, adequacy and functionality of physical facilities in schools.

More specifically, there have been a handful of studies that have included variables relating to the specifics of the management arrangements on any indicator of performance

Table 2: Effect of Specifics of Management Arrangements on Performance

		Type of Performance		
		Student Performance	Inputs (Monetary, Physical)	Teacher Working Conditions
Di Gropello & Marshall	Honduras	Parental Participation		
Eskeland & Filmer	Argentina	Autonomy Autonomy X Participation		
King & Ozler	Nicaragua	*De facto* Autonomy		
World Bank	Ghana		Help from PTA; SMC participation; household participation	PTA positive, SMC negative

Honduras: Index of Parental Participation based on school director appraisal of parental help with homework, involvement with school activities, donations of materials and contribution to the school's development.
Nicaragua: *De facto* autonomy is defined as the percentage of 25 key decisions that are taken by the school as compared to the municipal delegate or Ministry of Education.
Argentina: details of indexes of autonomy and Parental Participation in Appendix 2.

6. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

6.1 Background

"When communities are not involved in establishing, supporting, or overseeing a school, the school is often seen as something alien" (World Bank, 2004, p. 112). Autonomy and community involvement also allow community members to adapt schools to local conditions and to experiment with what works and adjust provision based on how well they are perceived to meet local objectives. In theory, autonomy motivates clients to become more involved in improving schools as they are able to adapt schools to local conditions, use resources in a way that match the needs of a community, and take ownership of changes.

"Also important, but less well explored in short route focused reforms to date is what the WDR04 refers to as the compact." (Gershberg, Meade et al. 2012, p.189). The compact is the relationship between policymakers or politicians and providers (Fiszbein, 2005), and in education refers to "how well and how clearly the responsibilities and objectives of public engagement are communicated to the public and to private organizations that provide services (Ministries of Education, school districts)." (World Bank, 2004, p. 113). As Gershberg, Gozalez et al., 2012, p.1026) explain, "If the compact is functioning effectively, policies will match client needs and service providers will be held accountable for implementation."

6.2 Complexity of analysing effects of SBM:

The SBM literature is mostly 'black box' in that we have very little evidence on the mechanisms / pathways to influencing student outcomes; and in particular on how the actual composition, activities of, and how school councils actually operate might influence outcomes (Carr-Hill et al., 2016).

Improvements in student academic outcomes, where data is available, are small; but it does look like parental perception improves with SMCs which may well have unmeasured effects on the mental well-being of not only the parents but also of their children/ students.

6.3 Voice and Participation

There is only limited quantitative evidence on whether decentralization *per se* can improve the efficiency of schools through voice and participation. Some analysts interpret a positive effect of user charges (or local finance) on school performance as being due to a greater sense of ownership, which makes parental voice more effective (Jimenez and Paqueo, 1996; James, King, and Suryadi 1996). King and Ozler (2000) find better test scores among schools that have more *de facto* autonomy in Nicaragua. Jimenez and Sawada (1999) find that *participation* by parents and the local community improves performance in El Salvador's EDUCO schools, despite the much poorer conditions in which they work.

6.4 Where there is School Based Management

This may not result in well-managed schools and empowerment. In many important areas, schools may have less decision-making power in practice than is intended. The effectiveness of school-based management will depend to a large extent on the capacity of local stakeholders to manage schools, so that the bureaucracy and inefficiencies of some centralized education systems may be replaced by general mismanagement of resources in decentralized systems. To avoid corruption and elite capture, school-based management reforms should avoid placing large amounts of power in the hands of any one stakeholder.

National and Regional Policy context. The evidence is clear that the vast majority of variation in implementation is *within* and *not between* countries; what happens at the school level matters. At the same time, in some

countries, teachers' unions are powerful and have tended to resist the school-based management reforms, seen as a threat to union power and teachers' job stability; and these have to be negotiated.

Do teachers respond to incentives?. Some of the studies show that teachers are working more hours, assigning more homework, and meeting more often with parents. These changes should contribute to increased student learning. Where teaching quality was low, these changes are critical steps in a positive direction; but need to be encouraged with opportunities for development for teachers.

Do teaching methods or qualifications improve?. The reforms have clearly created new incentives for teachers, but most of these changes are resource-utilization changes—smaller classes, more hours, fewer closings—not changes in the kind of teaching that is taking place inside classrooms. Regular parental visits to classes do appear to be effective and should be encouraged.

Unintended Consequences for Teachers and Friction with Parents Lower salaries, and less secure jobs may discourage talented teachers from working in locally managed schools. In some circumstances, there can be friction between newly empowered parents and teachers; these have to be addressed.

Measurement of Performance. The evidence from developed countries is that several years are needed for positive effects to be observed. Although a wide variety of performance measures have been used in the studies, none appear to have addressed possible changes in student confidence or morale which may well be where there are more long-term impacts.

Appendix 1: From Cotton, K

Nomenclature: there are several terms: Community Education Associations (ACE), (AECO), (COGES), Local School Councils (COEDUCA), Parents-Teachers Associations (PTAs), School Councils (SCs), School Governing Board (SGBs), School Management Committee (SMCs). Whilst there is no absolute consistency, the labels including 'community' or 'parent' tend to reflect the more advisory bodies rather than those with any decision-making authority.

Many terms have been commonly used to specify the arrangement. Arterbury and Hord (1991) identify: such terms as decentralization, restructuring, sitebased management, school-based management, participatory decision-making, school-based autonomy-- to name a few (p. 2). At the beginning of the debates about school-based management, writers argued about the correct designation of the school-based management concept: whether it should be by the terms decentralized management, shared decision making, school empowerment, shared governance, decentralized authority, school-site autonomy, school-based decision making, school-site management, responsible autonomy, the autonomous school concept, administrative decentralization, and school-based governance (Ceperley 1991; Cistone, Fernandez, and Tornillo 1989; Johnston and Germinario 1985; and Lewis 1989). This plethora of terms produced confusion until the realization that they all pointed in the same direction and that: "the name is not as important as the shifts in authority that are taking place....No matter what the term...the school takes center stage in today's education reform scene." (Lewis 1989, pp. 173- 174)

Definitions: For example: INCREASED AUTONOMY--the latitude to function independently to a considerable degree--may or may not accompany the increase in authority at the school site. INCREASED SCHOOL-SITE ACCOUNTABILITY is likewise a feature of some school-based management efforts but not others. The POWER TO ESTABLISH POLICY may or may not accompany the increase in the school's power to make other kinds of decisions. DECISION-MAKING DOMAINS differ enormously among different school-based management arrangements. Districts and boards may extend decision-making authority to the school in the major areas of budget and/or staffing and/or curriculum, as well as other domains. The EXTENT OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY WITHIN DOMAINS also differs. For example, two districts implementing school-based management structures may both allow their schools to make decisions in the area of curriculum, but one may permit substantive decisions to be made and implemented, while the other allows only relatively trivial ones. The DISTRIBUTION OF AUTHORITY AT SCHOOL SITES shows considerable variation as well. In some school-based management efforts, virtually all the increased decision-making authority extended to the site by the district remains in the hands of the principal. In others, teachers--but not other stakeholders--join the principal in making decisions. In most cases, however, decision-making authority is delegated to councils which might be made up of noncertified school staff and/or parents and/or community members and/or students, as well as the principal and the teachers. Another difference across sites is the DEGREE OF REAL POWER HELD BY THE COUNCILS. That is, the presence of a broad-based decision-making body representing all major stakeholder groups does not necessarily guarantee that the interests of all groups are truly represented. Some principals assemble such groups and then either occupy their time with petty matters or retain veto power over their decisions.

Appendix 2: Indexes of Autonomy and Participation in Eskeland and Filmer

Autonomy in teachers management and organization
Decisions about organization of teacher's work
Criteria for evaluation of teachers' performance
Autonomy in curricular and pedagogical matters
Curricular innovations
Selection of didactic material
Criteria for evaluation of students' performance
Selection of textbooks
Autonomy in relations with parents
Decisions regarding parents meetings
Autonomy in other matters
Decisions about organizational aspects of the school
Decisions about elaboration of institutional projects
Decisions about inclusion of material of interdisciplinary content
Decisions about elaboration of disciplinary norms
School plans extracurricular activities

Parental participation
Parents' participation in teachers management and organization
Decision-making regarding organization of teacher's work
Setting the criteria for evaluation of teachers' performance
Parents' participation in curricular and pedagogical matters
Selection of didactic material
Selection of textbooks
Development of criteria for evaluation of students' performance
Decisions regarding curricular innovations
Parents' participation in parents' convocations
Decisions regarding parents meetings
Parents' participation in other matters
Elaboration of institutional project
Elaboration of disciplinary norms
Planning extracurricular activities
Organizational aspects of the school
Inclusion of material of interdisciplinary content
Pct. of parents who regularly participate in school activities

Index of parents assistance to meetings
Parents participate in the creation of policies
Families participate by contributing additional resources

Parent Participation Indices

Supportive Actions Index
In kind contributions (0/1)
Funds per pupil (FCFA)
School committee supervises pupil attend (0/1)
School committee sanctions pupil attend (0/1)
Management Actions Index
School committee collects fees (0/1)
School committee spends fees (0/1)
Time since last school committee meeting (months)
Time since last parental association meeting (months)
School committee responsible for supplies (0/1)
School committee responsible for infrastructure (0/1)
Maternal association is active (0/1)
Oppositional Actions
School committee supervises teacher attend (0/1)
School committee sanctions teacher attend (0/1)

School Quality Indices

Accountability Index
Register for visits (0/1)
Register for inventory (0/1)
Register for activities (0/1)
Register for fundraising (viewed) (0/1)
Register for expenses (viewed) (0/1)
Minutes at last school committee meeting (0/1)
Minutes at last parental association meeting (0/1)
School action plan (viewed) (0/1)
Register for teacher attendance (0/1)
Register for pupil attendance (0/1)

Teacher Effort Index
% of teachers present at visit
School is open at visit (0/1)
Director present at visit (0/1)
Infrastructure Index
Number of latrines in the school
Water Access (0/1)
School Enclosure (0/1)
Number of buildings in the school
Number of desks in the school
Number of blackboards in the school
Number of books in the school

Appendix 3: Gunnarsson et al, Construction of measures of autonomy, participation, and school shortages

A. Responses used in the creation of the Autonomy variable

Asked of principal: With 1= no autonomy; 2= some autonomy; and 3= high autonomy; what degree of autonomy does school have in:

1. hiring personnel? (1.70; 0.55)[1]
2. allocating budget? (1.86; 0.59)
3. choosing textbooks and materials? (2.32; 0.50)
4. admissions, suspensions or expulsions? (2.39; 0.44)
5. student promotions? (2.77; 0.26)
6. setting disciplinary regulations? (2.54; 0.58)
7. setting curricular priorities? (2.55; 0.62)
8. planning and executing extracurricular activities? (2.68; 0.51)

First factor loading using the iterated principal factor method explained 58% of the covariation across the eight autonomy indicators.

B. Responses used in the creation of the Participation variable

Asked of the teacher: With 1= low; 2= medium; and 3= high; what is the level of parental participation in:

1. school activities? (1.72; 0.77)[a]
2. interest in the child's development? (1.79; 0.77)

First factor loading using the iterated principal factor method explained 100% of the covariation across the three participation indicators.

C. Responses used in the creation of the Shortage variable

Asked of the teacher: With 1= adequate and 2=inadequate; what is the level of:

1. zclassroom lighting? (1.25; 0.48)[a]
2. classroom temperature? (1.41; 0.41)
3. classroom hygiene? (1.20; 0.49)
4. classroom security? (1.30; 0.60)
5. classroom acoustics? (1.44; 0.42)

Asked of the teacher: With 0= yes and 1= no; do the students have:

1. language textbooks? (0.17; 0.55)
2. math textbooks? (0.33; 0.64)

Asked of the teacher: With 0= yes and 1= no; are there enough textbooks so that the students have:

1. one textbook each? (0.42; 0.58)

First factor loading using the iterated principal factor method explained 60% of the covariation across the eight inadequacy indicators.

[1] Estimate and standard error

D. ANOVA Evaluation of Autonomy, Participation and Inadequacy variables

ANOVA analysis of Autonomy: 95% of the variation in Autonomy is within country
5% of the variation in Autonomy is across countries

ANOVA analysis of Participation: 96% of the variation in Participation is within country
4% of the variation in Participation is across countries

ANOVA analysis of Inadequacy: 82% of the variation in Inadequacy is within countries
18% of the variation in Inadequacy is across countries

Average value and factors loading in parenthesis

Appendix 4: CERCA (Civic Engagement for Education Reform in Central America)

Questions asked in Qualitative Studies in Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua
(Cardenal et al., 2004)

- How do parents and other members of the community participate in supporting the school and the improvement of education?
- How does local community participation contribute to the improvement of education?
- Why do parent and other members of the community participate in improving education?
- What systematic factors facilitate local participation and improve its effectiveness?
- What systematic factors obstruct local participation and diminish its effectiveness?
- What changes in national public policies and the interventions whether by the state or other key stakeholders could reinforce local community participation and make it more effective?

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